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   One of the most important books in the emergence of ‘Newtonian physics’
in the eighteenth century was the Physices elementa mathematica, experimentis
confirmata; sive introductio ad philosophiam Newtonianam. The first edition of
this book was published in 1719; revised, updated, and widely popular ver-
sions of it would appear in 1725 and 1742.1 The last of these was published
shortly after the death of its author, the Dutch philosopher, physicist, and
mathematician Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande (1688-1742). As the title of the
book indicates and subsequent statements by ’s Gravesande confirm, he him-
self considered the book to be about ‘mathematical physics’ and to follow
Isaac Newton’s methodology. This became very clear for instance from the
preface ’s Gravesande added to the second edition of his book, where he dis-
cussed how he disagreed with Newton on the measure of force but not on the
way of doing their business:
Although I have moved away from the Newtonian opinion in many things […]
I have never doubted in any way to still maintain the title an Introduction to
Newtonian Philosophy, and to give this title to the second edition of this book it-
1 See DE PATER 1988, 152 for a list of editions; the book, its abbreviated versions, and their
various translations together went through more than 20 print runs in the eighteenth
century.
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self. […] He who reasons only from the phenomena in physics, having rejected
all feigned hypotheses, and, as much as he is able, follows this method chastely,
tries to follow in those footsteps of Newton and rightly professes to follow the
Newtonian philosophy; not on the contrary he who vows to the words of the
master.2
As Steffen Ducheyne has shown in a study published in 2014, historians as
yet have not sufficiently questioned to what extent ’s Gravesande was justifi-
ably claiming to follow the methodology set out by Isaac Newton. In this art-
icle I will expand on the work done by Ducheyne, who in the same study has
explored some components of the methodology of ’s Gravesande’s physics,
focusing especially on the question whether ’s Gravesande had taken over
certain elements particular to Newton’s methodology. Ducheyne has shown
that, with respect to most of these issues, this was not the case and has
claimed that ’s Gravesande «was selective in his endorsement of Newton’s
epistemology» and that «his methodological ideas were quite different from
and occasionally even incongruent with Newton’s views on the matter».3
2 ’S GRAVESANDE 1725(1), second and third of the unnumbered pages of the Monitum de
hac Secunde Editione: «Quamvis in multis […] a NEWTONIANA recesserim sententia, non
tamen titulum Introductionis ad Philosophiam Newtonianam servare, & huic secundae
editioni ipsum inscribere, ullo modo dubitavi. […] Qui tantum ex Phaenomenis, omni
ficta rejecta hypothesi, in Physices ratiocinantur, &, quantum in ipso est, caste hanc me-
thodum sequitur, ille NEWTONI vestigiis insistere conatur, & merito NEWTONIANAM se sec-
tari Philosophiam profitetur; non autem ille, qui in verba jurat magistri». I am grateful
to Urte Brauckmann of the Library of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science
for sending me a digital copy of this particular edition of ’s Gravesande’s book.
Throughout, translations are mine, unless indicated otherwise. 
3 DUCHEYNE 2014(1), 47 and DUCHEYNE 2014(2), 112 respectively. DUCHEYNE 2014(2), 97-98
contains references to literature that considers ’s Gravesande as a follower of Newton’s
methodology. Many of ’s Gravesande’s own statements of his adherence to Newton’s
methods can be found in ibid., 100-104. Qua methodology, Ducheyne has mostly fo-
cused on Newton’s use of the regulae philosophandi, his quest in the Principia for math-
ematical relations that are both necessary and sufficient, and the use Newton made of
successive approximations in that same book. Ducheyne’s conclusion is that «none of
these salient features of Newton’s methodology and physico-mathematics were empha-
sized by ‘s Gravesande in his Physices elementa», see DUCHEYNE 2014(2), 104.
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As becomes clear from both Ducheyne’s work and that of previous historians
who have summarized ’s Gravesande’s assertions on these matters, ’s Graves-
ande’s statements on what he himself called the Newtonian methodology did
not amount to a full-fledged methodological programme. Instead, what the
literature tells us is that ’s Gravesande was mostly concerned with stressing
the need for a combination of experimental and mathematical methods, a
combination which he claimed no one before Newton had actually followed
or had even proposed as the method to be followed.4 Although this shows
that ’s Gravesande was without a doubt inspired by Newton’s natural philo-
sophy, this minimalistic description does not tell us much about the way ’s
Gravesande performed his own ‘physics’.5
Consequently, the situation at present is that we know that ’s Graves-
ande cannot simply be described as a ‘methodological Newtonian’ but that
we do not have an alternative to replace this view with. Given ’s Graves-
ande’s pivotal role in eighteenth-century physics, this situation is of course
unsatisfactory. It is a well-known fact that the status, contents, and relations
between the so-called fields of natural philosophy, physics, and the mathem-
atical sciences underwent significant changes in the eighteenth century.6
Since ’s Gravesande was one of the most widely read contemporary authors
in the amalgam of these fields, it is of great interest to understand how ’s
4 As is indicated by for instance RUESTOW 1973, 121; DE PATER 1994, 262; DE PATER, 1995,
222; SCHUURMAN 2004, 141-142; SCHLIESSER 2011; 115, 119; JORINK, ZUIDERVAART 2012, 34-
35; see ’S GRAVESANDE 1723, last page of the unnumbered preface «ad lectorem», for the
claim that Newton was the first to propose this method of reasoning from the phenom-
ena while rejecting hypotheses.
5 Besides Ducheyne, only MAAS 2012 has recently tried to point out particular character-
istics of ’s Gravesande’s physics other than his alleged Newtonianism. Maas has dis-
cussed in particular ’s Gravesande’s attempts to limit human interference and individu-
al imagination, see MAAS 2012, 117, 131-132.
6 For a recent discussion of these disciplinary changes, see HEILBRON 2011.
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Gravesande aimed to contribute to them and what he took these fields to be
about. Yet, as becomes clear from Ducheyne’s conclusions, we cannot simply
assume that what ’s Gravesande himself claimed to do connects
unproblematically to what he did in reality. Studying his epistemology,
methodology, and the relations between the two both in precept and in
practice is therefore particularly useful to discussions of what eighteenth-
century physics consisted of.
In this article, I will make a modest contribution to a more productive
understanding of these issues by focusing on one particular part of ’s Graves-
ande’s methodology, namely the application of mathematics in philosophy
and physics. As becomes already clear from the title of ’s Gravesande’s book,
he considered mathematics to be central to physics. As we will see through-
out, ’s Gravesande also repeatedly stressed the importance of what he called
mathematical methods and mathematical evidence to philosophizing in gen-
eral, in particular with respect to finding certain knowledge. This, together
with the fact that mathematics was of key importance in Newton’s natural
philosophy, turns the question of whether and how ’s Gravesande actually
applied mathematics in his own scholarly work into one of particular relev-
ance.
So far, little has been written on this account: Ducheyne’s study con-
firms that ’s Gravesande considered mathematics central to physics, but
Ducheyne, following his remark that ’s Gravesande did not «go into the de-
tails on […] how mathematics and experimentation are to be integrated ex-
actly», has not elaborated much on how ’s Gravesande would go about this in
practice.7 John L. Heilbron, on the other hand, has recently even claimed,
7 DUCHEYNE 2014(2), 102.
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without providing much evidence, that ’s Gravesande’s books, «[d]espite
their titles, […] contain very little mathematics».8 Even if this were indeed the
case and there were a serious tension between what ’s Gravesande said and
what he did, the question why he stressed the role of mathematics would still
remain of substantial importance.
The only study that has treated the role of mathematics in ’s Graves-
ande’s work to some length is the dissertation of Giambattista Gori published
in 1972, La fondazione dell’esperienza in ’s Gravesande. Unfortunately, recent
scholarship has not paid sufficient attention to Gori’s work; language issues
are at least partly to blame for this. Interestingly enough, Gori has pointed
out that there is an apparent leap in ’s Gravesande’s work. In the latter’s more
philosophical works, mathematics had according to Gori a «generic task»
whereas in ’s Gravesande’s physics, mathematics played the more obvious
role of demonstrating relations quantitatively.9 Gori has argued that we need
to «find a unitary answer to the problem of mathematics in ’s Gravesande» in
order to close the gap between ’s Gravesande’s philosophical reflections and
his scientific content.10 Although Gori has softened this tension by pointing
out that mathematics played a subsidiary role in physics as well—as a true
experimentalist, ’s Gravesande had strong doubts about finding direct
correlations between mathematics and reality—Gori has not really provided
8 HEILBRON 2011, 176. Heilbron extends this claim to ’s Gravesande’s younger colleague
and eventual successor Petrus van Musschenbroek; a comparison between Van
Musschenbroek and ’s Gravesande on this point might be of great interest but falls out-
side the scope of this article. See also VANPAEMEL 2003, 210: «’s Gravesande […] gradu-
ally made the mathematical proofs disappear in the successive editions of his Physices
elementa mathematica». Quite the opposite is true, as will become abundantly clear in the
next sections: mathematical proofs multiplied in successive editions of the book.
9 GORI 1972, 178-203, in particular 190-192.
10 Ibid., 192. «Tuttavia rimane l’esigenza di trovare una risposta unitaria al problema della
matematica in ’sGravesande».
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the unitary answer he was looking for himself.11 Here, instead, I will show
that we can narrow the gap between the two different applications of
mathematics in ’s Gravesande by regarding both from a methodological
perspective.
In what follows, I will explore these different uses of mathematics in the
philosophy and physics of ’s Gravesande in detail. A preliminary section
summarizes his more programmatic utterances about the methodological use
of mathematics. After that, I first address ’s Gravesande’s applications of
these methodological statements in the actual practice of his physics; in doing
so, I challenge Heilbron’s conclusion about the importance of mathematics in
’s Gravesande’s Physices elementa mathematica. The last section of this article
explicates how ’s Gravesande’s application of mathematics to philosophy in
general was part of one overarching epistemological goal, namely that of
finding certain and true knowledge in physics as well as in other scholarly
disciplines. As such, this article provides us with a more articulated view on
what ’s Gravesande regarded as the subject of physica and the proper aims
and practices of this discipline.
2. ’s Gravesande on the applications of mathematics
   The claim that the study of mathematics was of great use to philosophers
can be found consistently throughout ’s Gravesande public lectures, the pre-
faces of his books, and the methodological chapters of those books. He
provided two main arguments for this usefulness. As we will see, the first
11 Ibid., 196-203. Gori does not explicitly come back to the question of mathematics in the
section in which he raises it, and neither does he return to the role of mathematics after-
wards.
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was that knowledge of mathematics was a necessity for philosophers who
wanted to do physics. Besides that, according to ’s Gravesande, mathematics
was particularly useful for learning «the art of reasoning». Mathematics was
the quintessential example of a field that could teach us the logic and rigour
needed in order to find true propositions, he claimed in an oration held at
Leiden University in 1734:
It remains for me to say a few things about mathematics […] Not only is it the
key to physics, and many of its parts treat of pure physics: but where one deals
with the art of reasoning, and of the rules of revealing the truth in any science
whatsoever, mathematics has an astonishing use: therefore it is not to be separ-
ated from philosophy.12
‘Philosophy’ was defined by ’s Gravesande in the same oration literally as the
love of wisdom. It included all scholarly pursuits—different disciplines such
as physics, history, and logic, to which ’s Gravesande referred as «sciences»—
but was not restricted only to the scholarly disciplines themselves. Therefore,
the second use of mathematics would apply basically to all of humanity.13 On
its first use, that in physics, ’s Gravesande argued that in fields such as mech-
anics, astronomy, and hydrostatics we dealt primarily with motion. Con-
sequently, we would need to make use of quantities because motion was best
expressed as such:
12 ’S GRAVESANDE 1734, I, 45: «Superest ut pauca de Mathesi addam […] Non tantum est
clavis Physices, & multae illius partes mera Physica tractant: sed ubi de Arte ratiocinan-
di, & regulis detegendi Veri in scientia quacumque, agitur, mirum usum Mathesis ha-
bet: quare a Philosophia separanda haec non est».
13 Ibid., 26: «Philosophia, ut ipsum nomen indicat, est Sapientiae amor […] Hominibus
omnibus necessaria est, ad omnes extendit, & in omni vitae statu, & ultra illas discipli-
nas sese expandit quae vulgo ad ipsam referuntur». I will come back to ’s Gravesande’s
views on disciplinary demarcations below.
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All things in physics are accomplished by motion; because no change can be
made to bodies, or at least be perceived by us, except that which is made by mo-
tion or produces motion […] But motion itself is a quantity; it can be increased
and diminished; whatever therefore attends to [motion], that is, all in physics,
ought to be treated mathematically.14
Since mathematics was according to ’s Gravesande the field of philosophy
that treated of quantities, we evidently would need mathematics in order to
do any serious work in mechanics, astronomy and hydrostatics as well. In
turn these disciplines, and therefore mathematics, would give us useful
knowledge in such practicalities as navigation, water management, and time-
keeping.15
Both of these uses of mathematics appeared already in the oration ’s
Gravesande held when he accepted the chair of mathematics and astronomy
at Leiden University in 1717,16 when he was only in his late twenties. It is
noteworthy that the topic of this inaugural lecture was exactly the use of
mathematics and that ’s Gravesande was initially appointed to a chair of
mathematics and astronomy in Leiden. This of course meant that defending
his discipline and pointing to its potential uses was of interest to ’s Graves-
ande for more than purely intellectual reasons; therefore, we should not jump
14 ’S GRAVESANDE 1717, 15: «Motu omnia in Physica peraguntur; nulla enim mutatio in cor-
poribus fieri potest, aut saltem a nobis sentiri, nisi quae motu fit aut motum producit
[…] Motus autem est quantitas; augeri & minui potest; quidquid ergo ad illum spectat,
id est, tota Physica, Mathematice tractari debet». See also ’S GRAVESANDE 1720, sixth page
of the unnumbered Praefatio: «Agitur ubique [in Physicis] de motuum collatione, id est,
de quantitatum comparatione, circa quam qui demonstrationibus Mathematicis in ratio-
ciniis non progrediatur, si non in errorem, saltem in incertas conclusiones incidet». Al-
though the title page gives the year 1720, the first volume appeared in fall 1719; see also
the Privilegie on the first page of the book, dated 8 November 1719.
15 See ’S GRAVESANDE 1717, 16-17 for his argument for the necessity of mathematics in
mechanics and hydrostatics. Later parts of this text deal extensively with astronomy;




to conclusions about the aims of his 1717 lecture too soon. As I have pointed
out elsewhere, most of ’s Gravesande’s earlier work was in mathematics, for
instance in statistics and in the mathematical study of perspective. ’s Graves-
ande would only later become officially affiliated with the studies of physics
and philosophy, the disciplines in which he would become most famous.17
However, that we should not merely interpret his discussion of the use
of mathematics as defensive rhetoric becomes clear from the fact that the two
uses of mathematics would continue to be central to ’s Gravesande’s dis-
course throughout his entire career. The oration of 1734 cited above was in
fact held because of his appointment to the more prestigious chair of philo-
sophy, still at Leiden University, which he would combine with his chair in
mathematics and astronomy.18 After this promotion, ’s Gravesande would
start to teach additional courses in philosophy proper, but, as we have seen,
the uses of mathematics remained important to him. Mathematics also
figured as the privileged way of finding true propositions in his Introductio ad
philosophiam of 1736, a book devoted predominantly to metaphysics and lo-
gic.19
Consequently, it seems evident that ’s Gravesande’s pleading for the
use of mathematics was sincere. Yet, he was not an uncritical devotee of
mathematics: he also addressed the limits of its applications. Wherever he
would argue that mathematics was key to doing physics, ’s Gravesande also
claimed that one could not draw physical conclusions on the basis of math-
ematics alone. As I will discuss more extensively in the last part of this article,
’s Gravesande’s argument was that abstract mathematics pertained only to
17 VAN BESOUW 2016.
18 See the title page of ’S GRAVESANDE 1734.
19 ’S GRAVESANDE 1736, see for instance 139, point 465; and 233, point 663.
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our ideas, and not directly to the reality outside of us.20
Because of this, ’s Gravesande also made quite negative remarks about
pursuing mathematics just for its own sake on a number of occasions. In the
preface of a book intended for the teaching of the basics of mathematics, he
for instance first repeated his claim that this study could help us to train our
mind, but after that added that he who would study mathematics without
considering its applications «does not learn the proper mathematical method,
but creates a disposition suitable only for reasonings about quantity».21 Ac-
cording to his friend and biographer Jean Allamand, ’s Gravesande used
mathematics first and foremost as a means to get utile results for society and
even disdained those «calculators» whose inquiries led only to pure specula-
tion and not to any use for the other sciences or humanity in general.22
To sum up, ’s Gravesande claimed that mathematics was useful pre-
dominantly or even exclusively because of its possible applications. He dis-
cussed two main lines of those applications: that of teaching the way of reas-
oning needed for finding true knowledge on the one hand, and its practical
uses in physics and in technological endeavours on the other hand. Clearly
then, ’s Gravesande regarded mathematics mainly as a methodological tool, a
20 This argument is present in virtually all of ’s Gravesande’s methodological discussions.
Perhaps the most influential locus where he makes this point is the preface of the first
edition of the Physices elementa mathematica. See ’S GRAVESANDE 1720, seventh page of the
unnumbered Praefatio. 
21 ’S GRAVESANDE 1727, Praefatio: «Qui enim dum Mathesi animum applicat, relique negli-
git, non proprie methodum Mathematicam addiscit, sed solis ratiociniis circa quantita-
tem ingenium aptum facit».
22 ALLAMAND 1774, xxiii: «Il méprisoit ces Calculateurs de profession, qui passent leur vie
à la recherche de vérités de pure spéculation, dont la découverte n’est d’aucune utilité
soit pour les autres sciences, soit pour les besoins de la vie». See for instance also the
preface to ’S GRAVESANDE 1711, his first book, dedicated to the mathematics of perspect-
ives. In this preface, ’s Gravesande argues that he wants to find a middle ground
between mathematical theory and application of that theory, explicitly in order to be of
use to the painters that need to apply the theory of perspective.
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catalyst for the development of philosophy in general and physics in
particular.
3. Mathematical physics 
   The last of these two uses of mathematics, its application to physical prob-
lems, seems relatively straightforward. Yet, we have already seen that, ac-
cording to Heilbron, there is very little mathematics in the Physices elementa
mathematica. Although most historians argue for the more nuanced position
that there is in fact an important mathematical component in the book, it has
often been stressed that the most important characteristic of ’s Gravesande’s
physics was its experimental nature. Following a single letter written by ’s
Gravesande to Newton in 1718, we often read that an important aim of the
former’s book was to make Newton’s Principia accessible to those without
mathematical training.23 Indeed, in the letter we read that ’s Gravesande had
to demonstrate Newton’s conclusions by experiment because his audience in
general would not really understand mathematics: 
[A]s I talk to people who have made very little progress in mathematics I have
been obliged to have several machines constructed to convey the force of pro-
positions whose demonstrations they had not understood.24
Although the machines mentioned in the letter indeed figure prominently in
his book, we should begin by taking into account that ’s Gravesande’s letter
to Newton talks about the former’s lessons rather than about his book, which
23 See for instance NYDEN 2014, 213, 218; JORINK, ZUIDERVAART 2012, 36.
24 Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande to Isaac Newton, 13/24 June 1718. This letter is printed in
HALL 1982, 26.
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still had to be written in 1718. Still, the full title of the book, The basic mathem-
atical principles of physics, confirmed by experiments; or, an introduction to Newto-
nian philosophy,25 does indeed indicate that ’s Gravesande ‘confirmed’ his
physics via experiments. Moreover, anyone who will leaf through the first
edition published in 1719 will agree that it indeed contains little mathematics.
In general, only elementary operations on proportions between physical en-
tities such as forces, velocities, and distances can be found in this edition.
There are some places where ’s Gravesande touched upon non-trivial math-
ematics, but the sole place where more than basic mathematical skills were
required from the reader seems to be his chapter on the rainbow. In that
chapter, which counts seven pages out of a total of roughly 400, multiple re-
fractions and reflections led ’s Gravesande to compute among other things
the proportions between different arcs.26
Clearly, the question of what was mathematical about ’s Gravesande’s
actual physics remains to be answered. It seems that the conclusion that there
was little mathematics in ’s Gravesande’s Physices elementa mathematica is war-
ranted, and it becomes clear where Heilbron’s argument comes from. How-
ever, as will become evident here, ’s Gravesande’s omission of heavy math-
25 The contemporary English translations by J. T. Desaguliers, of which the first edition
was published in 1719 and the sixth and last in 1747, has the straightforward title The
mathematical elements of natural philosophy […]. I wish to avoid such a translation of the
Latin word ‘elementa’ with the English ‘element’ because of the latter’s connotation of
being some small part of a greater whole. The Latin ‘elementa’ does not obviously have
this connotation and it is not the case that ’s Gravesande tried to give just some of the
mathematical principles of physics. 
26 See ’S GRAVESANDE 1721, 92-98 and plate 18. Besides this chapter, dense mathematical
language can be found only on a singular page, namely ibid., 162, on gravitational inter-
action between the Moon and the Earth. The reference is here to the second volume of
the first edition. As this volume is numbered separately from the first and the date on
the title page differs between the volumes as well, I will refer to the specific volume
throughout and will distinguish the two in the bibliography.
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ematics was grounded in educational considerations rather than methodolo-
gical ones. If we look deeper, we will see that mathematics did in fact play an
important methodological role in the book. Moreover, from the second edi-
tion of the Physices elementa mathematica on, this role reveals itself much more
openly. Since such differences between the editions have not received suffi-
cient attention in previous studies, I will discuss their various contents in
some detail. It will become apparent that the book did much more than just
making Newton’s physics «accessible to those without advanced mathemat-
ics». This section ends with one example of ’s Gravesande’s application of
mathematics to an experiment in physics. From that example, we can draw
some conclusions about what role mathematics played in ’s Gravesande’s
physics in general.
In the same note to the reader in the second edition in which ’s Graves-
ande argued that one should follow Newton’s method rather than Newton’s
opinions, he also pointed to the main difference between the two editions of
his work, this being that he had taken the trouble in the second to make his
book more valuable for those with extended mathematical training:
So that [the first edition of] the book would be useful especially to beginners, I
left everything difficult untouched, I often indicated that propositions, to which
I only referred, had been proved by geometers. However, so that this second
edition would be of use, and to readers more versatile in mathematics, I have
added mathematical demonstrations to all such propositions, in scholia annexed
to those chapters wherever they have been indicated.27
27 ’S GRAVESANDE 1725(1), first of the unnumbered pages of the Monitum de hac Secunde Edi-
tione: «Cumque, ut tironibus praecipue liber hicce utilis esset, difficiliora omnia intacta
relinquerem, saepe propositiones indicavi, de quibus tantum monuji, has a Geometris
probari. Ut autem secunda haec editio, & lectoribus magis in Mathematicis versatis,
usui esset, propositiones tales omnes, in capite quicunque indicatas, Mathematice de-
monstratas in scholiis, capitibus subjunctis, adjeci».
29
And this is indeed what one finds in the second edition, as well as in the
third, of the Physices elementa mathematica. The second edition of 1725 contains
roughly 150 pages more than the first, the third edition of 1742 adds more
than 500 pages to the second one. The typesetting remains the same through-
out all editions apart from the scholia which are «printed in minor character
so that those other readers [not versatile in mathematics] are not disturbed».28
That many of the additions to the second concern ‘difficult things’ left out for
didactic reasons in the first edition becomes clear as well from the ‘supple-
ment’ version of the 1725 edition. This supplement was created for those who
already owned the 1720 edition. Roughly half of its 174 pages concern things
which are clearly mathematical in nature; the rest of the supplement relates
mostly to ’s Gravesande’s own work in the vis viva controversy: as is well
known, ’s Gravesande changed from the ‘Newtonian’ to the ‘Leibnizian’
measure of force in 1722.29 The supplement contains the experiments which
led ’s Gravesande to change his initial position as well as the implications this
change had on his discussion of such topics as composite motions and the
mechanics of fluids.30
Some examples of actual mathematical problems addressed in the scho-
lia of the 1725 edition might serve to prove that ’s Gravesande did not add
merely trivial mathematics to his physics: in the opening chapters on general
philosophical ideas of bodies, the concept of divisibility and its infinite ap-
plication to extension led him to introduce the logarithmic spiral and to
discuss different classes of infinities; these discussions served mainly to show
the possibility of an infinite contained in a finite.31 To his considerations of
28 Ibid.: «Et ne haec lectores alios turbarent, ipsa minore charactere imprimi curavi».
29 This story is best told in HANKINS 1965, 286-291 and ILTIS 1973, 358-363.
30 ’S GRAVESANDE 1725(2).
31 ’S GRAVESANDE 1725(1), 9-12 and plate I. The status of the infinite was something to
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pendulums, which were of course used for experiments both on collision and
on free fall as well as for their use in controlling time, ’s Gravesande added
scholia on the properties of cycloids and showed how to determine the centre
of oscillation.32 These scholia did not merely constitute an exhibition of math-
ematical knowledge. In the first edition, ’s Gravesande had warned his read-
ers that his demonstration of the fact that a pendulum performs its respective
oscillations in equal times held only under certain conditions. This passage
was no longer needed in the second edition because the scholia would explain
the properties of oscillating pendulums in mathematical detail.33 Moreover, in
the first edition ’s Gravesande had to state in the same chapter that certain
things had been «demonstrated further by geometers»; in the second edition,
his readers no longer had to take him for his word on this as he actually
provided the proofs himself in the new scholia.34
Likewise, for his chapter on central forces, which was largely concerned
with experiments performed with an elaborate instrument developed by him-
self, ’s Gravesande added no less than twelve pages fully filled with scholia
running from the determination of circular motions to the determination of
ellipses, and then via accelerated elliptical motions to the «computation of the
movements of the apsides in curves very little different from the circle».35
which ’s Gravesande returned on different occasions. See for instance ’S GRAVESANDE
1717, 13, and references in GORI 1972, 190-191. These discussions must be understood in
the context of ongoing debates on the status and foundations of the concepts of the in-
finite and the infinitesimal. Discussion of these issues in the late seventeenth century
can be found throughout MANCOSU 1996.
32 ’S GRAVESANDE 1725(1), 71-75 and plate XI;
33 Compare ’S GRAVESANDE 1720, 45 with ’S GRAVESANDE 1725(1), 67.
34 ’S GRAVESANDE 1720, 46: «Demonstratur ulterius a Geometris […]», compare the same
passage in the second edition, ’S GRAVESANDE 1725(1), 68: «Ulterius in primo scholio de-
monstramus […]».
35 ’S GRAVESANDE 1725(1), 98-109 and plate XV, see p. 108: «De computatione motuum apsi-
dum in curvis parum cum circulo differentibus».
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These scholia obviously had important applications in astronomy as set out by
Newton in the Principia.
Naturally, it is in this last case unlikely that ’s Gravesande added much
new to the already existing mathematical treatments. We can assume that his
discussion of central forces relied on the revolutionary treatments of Christi-
aan Huygens and Newton of 1673 and 1687 respectively, even though all ref-
erences in these twelve pages are either to Euclid’s Elements or to La Hire’s
1673 Nouvelle méthode en géométrie pour les sections des superficies coniques et cy-
lindriques.36 As becomes clear from reading these particular scholia, however,
these references are not intended to credit La Hire and Euclid for the math-
ematical results in the scholia but rather to point to demonstrations for
particular inferential steps ’s Gravesande took. His scholia were, as noted
above, themselves often mathematical demonstrations of propositions he
used elsewhere and these additional references simply served to complete the
mathematical proofs. ’s Gravesande nowhere claimed that he himself was the
first to provide these demonstrations.
In fact, quite the opposite was true. In the first edition of his book, he
had argued that, since he published only the ‘basic principles’ of physics, ref-
erences to other works were unnecessary as most was already known.37 Al-
though the second edition clearly contained more than only basic principles,
’s Gravesande apparently did not change his mind about referring to other
works. It was only in the third edition that he provided a bibliographical
36 Ibid.
37 ’S GRAVESANDE 1720, tenth page of the unnumbered Praefatio: «He who draws up the ba-
sic principles of a science, does not offer as much new material to the learned world;
and for that reason, I have considered it useless to remind [the reader] where what is
treated here would be found»; «Qui scientiae elementa conscribit, non quid novi, quan-
tum ad materiam, Orbi Litterato pollicetur; ideoque inutile duxi monere ubi reperiantur
quea hic traduntur».
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essay so as to credit others and to refer his readers to the places where they
could find more.38 Yet, these references cannot be found in the body of the
text itself, and therefore more work would be required to determine on
whom ’s Gravesande built in the scholia to the Physices elementa mathematica
and to what extent he contributed to mathematics itself. To answer this ques-
tion, it would be necessary to study particular mathematical scholia in detail.
This would however fall outside of the scope of this study. Rather than claim-
ing that ’s Gravesande published new mathematical results, my aim here is to
show that he was in fact applying advanced mathematics in his physics. That
’s Gravesande was a gifted mathematician has been proved before, in particu-
lar with regard to his Essai de perspective published in 1711.39
The subject of this Essai was the mathematical study of perspective,
which was of course related to optics. We can infer from this that ’s Graves-
ande also knew how to apply mathematics to other fields than mechanics, to
which all of the above mentioned examples relate. In the second edition of
the Physices elementa mathematica of 1725, however, we can still only find scho-
lia related to either mechanics itself or to fluid mechanics. The reason for this
is that the first edition of the book was divided into two volumes, the first
concerned with mechanics and the study of fluids, almost exclusively fluid
mechanics, whereas the second volume dealt with astronomy and the study
38 ’S GRAVESANDE 1742, vol. I, Praefatio hujus tertiae editionis, xv-xxxv, see in particular xviii:
«In praecedentibus editionibus non indicavi ubi habeantur illa, quae ex aliis desumsi,
qoud a multis improbari percepi». It becomes clear from the respective prefaces of his
work that ’s Gravesande himself cared little about intellectual credit. I plan to discuss
this elsewhere in more detail.
39 ’S GRAVESANDE 1711. Many aspects of this book have been studied by ANDERSEN 2007,
328-360; see also the shorter treatment in CANTOR 1908, 594-597. For the importance of
this work to ’s Gravesande’s early career, see VAN BESOUW 2016, 238-242. Some aspect of
’s Gravesande’s mathematics have been discussed in SHOESMITH 1987, as well. An over-
view of ’s Gravesande’s mathematics would be extremely useful but does not exist as
yet.
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of light—its bulk being optics but some chapters on fire and electricity were
included as well. In the 1725 edition, only the first of these volumes was
updated,40 and its new mathematical scholia consequently related exclusively
to mechanics and fluids. With regard to the latter, ’s Gravesande in 1725 for
instance treated the deceleration of bodies moving in fluids and from this also
came to discuss logarithms. With these mathematical treatments, he was able
to differentiate between two types of deceleration, one where equal decreases
of velocity took place in equal times, and another where the decrease of
velocity was proportional to the square of that velocity.41
There is one single instance of an application of mathematics in this
1725 edition that starts to cross the boundaries of fluid mechanics. In the last
part of the first volume, still in the half of that volume dedicated to fluids, ’s
Gravesande discussed the properties of air, which he called ‘an elastic fluid’,
as well as the density of air and the propagation of sounds. Many of the argu-
ments made in these last chapters concerned experiments made with air
pumps.42 In earlier classifications, these chapters could have been described
as belonging to the field of pneumatics rather than to that of fluids. Two scho-
lia were added to this part on air in the second edition of the Physices elementa
mathematica. For our purposes, the first is the most interesting, as ’s
Gravesande there set out to show that the particles of air would move
according to the same mathematical law as a pendulum vibrating in a
40 ALLAMAND 1774, xxx, states that «les changemens faits au second [Tome] étoient peu
considérables» in the 1725 edition, but as far as I can see there were no changes whatso-
ever. All of the editions of the 1725 editions I have been able to locate either do not in-
clude the second volume at all or contain a copy of the original second volume as it was
printed first in 1721. This is confirmed by the list of DE PATER 1988, 152.
41 ’S GRAVESANDE 1725(1), 283-296 and plate XXXVII. These two types of deceleration are
closely connected to the vis viva controversy discussed above and therefore relate to ’s
Gravesande’s new discussion of mechanics as well.
42 ’S GRAVESANDE 1720, 158-188.
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cycloid,43 thus connecting the study of air with the better known case of the
mechanics of free fall.
Many more mathematical demonstrations were added in the scholia of
the last edition of the book, published in 1742. This edition was published
again in two volumes, but both of these single volumes are larger in them-
selves than the two volumes of the first edition taken together. As in that first
edition, the first volume of the 1742 print concerns mechanics and fluid
mechanics, but the parts on the mechanics of air are shifted to the second
volume, where they are combined into «Liber IV»44 with the parts on fire,
now taken out of the earlier parts on optics. Together, the discussions of air
and fire, as ’s Gravesande called them, rather than pneumatics and heat, take
up 127 pages, but no scholia are added to these parts besides the two already
existing in the 1725 second edition. Besides these parts, however, new scholia
can be found anywhere in the 1742 edition, both in the first volume on mech-
anics and fluids as well as in the parts on optics and astronomy in the second
volume. Interestingly, the computations on the rainbow, singled out above as
the only case of significant mathematical content in the 1720 edition, are no
longer found in the main text of the third edition, but are instead put in an
additional scholium to the chapter.45
Clearly, mathematics played an important part in the Physices elementa
mathematica, in contrast to what has sometimes been assumed. But what was
the exact role of such mathematical additions to ’s Gravesande’s practice? A
more detailed example might help to answer this question. In one of his most
43 ’S GRAVESANDE 1725(1), 342-344 and plate XLVII.
44 See the list of contents, ’S GRAVESANDE 1742, vol. I, lxx-lxxi. «Liber IV» of course trans-
lates as «book IV», but I will avoid this translation in order not to create confusion.
45 Ibid. II, 918-920; compare with ’S GRAVESANDE 1721, 93-97.
35
famous experiments, discussed at length in the last edition of his work, ’s
Gravesande dropped copper balls into a tray filled with clay in order to de-
termine the ‘force’ the balls would acquire during their fall. With this experi-
ment, he set out to demonstrate that this acquired force would be proportion-
al to the height of the fall and therefore, via the relations known from Ga-
lileo’s work, to the square of the velocity of the ball. This would show that the
force acquired in free fall was a concept that needed to be kept apart from the
concept of momentum, which was proportional to the velocity itself. By mak-
ing this distinction ’s Gravesande attempted to solve the vis viva controversy
mentioned above. According to ’s Gravesande, the force of the balls could be
found by the effect they had on the clay while coming to rest, that is, by the
volume of the cavity they made in the clay.
To make his experiment yield results that could be generalized into a
relation between force and velocity, ’s Gravesande made different trials with
balls of known weights and velocities. He performed the experiment with
balls of equal volume but with weights in ratios 1, 2, and 3 to each other, and
had a machine built with which he could vary the heights of fall. These differ-
ent heights stood in fixed ratios of 1, 2, 3, and 4 to each other. These simple
relations enabled ’s Gravesande to give the theoretically expected propor-
tions between the cavities with ease: given that the force would be as the
weight multiplied by the height of the fall, the force, and therefore the cavity
it made in the clay, of a ball with weight 3 and height 2 would be expected to
be six times as large as that of a ball with weight 1 and height 1. ’s Graves-
ande compared these theoretical values with the volumes of the cavities he
found in the actual experiments, and concluded that these experimental
values showed the same proportions and thereby confirmed his theoretical
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measure of force.46
Thus, ’s Gravesande used simple mathematical proportions in order to
compare the theoretical values for the forces with values he could find in a
tightly controlled experiment. This way, he was able to generalize the quant-
itative results of his experiment into a more complex relation between differ-
ent physical concepts, those being mass, height, velocity, and force in this
case. Yet, this is not the only way in which mathematics was involved in this
experiment. When ’s Gravesande compared the theoretical value with the
volume of the cavity yielded by the experiment, he could not measure this
volume directly. Instead, he measured the diameter of the cavity and referred
to a table (cf. Table 1, Appendix) he provided in a scholium in order to find the
volume from that diameter. As far as I am aware, ’s Gravesande nowhere dis-
cussed how to compute these volumes out of the diameter.47 Nevertheless,
this was not a particularly straightforward computation. The values ’s
Gravesande actually compared were those of the third column of the table.
These values are the volumes of the cavity in proportion to the volume of the
46 ’S GRAVESANDE 1742, vol. I, 243-244, see also 235-237 and plate XXXII. My understanding
of ’s Gravesande’s experiment, and in particular of the difficulties involved in drawing
out the results, has benefited enormously from discussions with Tiemen Cocquyt and
Ad Maas, as well as from their reenactment of the experiment: «The truth in a layer of
clay: A replication of ’s Gravesande’s vis viva experiment» during the international
workshop «Early eighteenth-century experimental philosophy in the Dutch Republic»,
7 July 2014, Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts, Brussels. Coc-
quyt and Maas are preparing a study of this experiment for publication. ILTIS 1973, in
particular 359-362, and COSTABEL 1964 are prominent older interpretations of the experi-
ment. Iltis offers a discussion of the context in which ’s Gravesande first performed
these experiment as well as a short description of her own repetition of one of his
experiments. Costabel describes the experiment in detail and focuses on the experi-
mental difficulties. Although his discussion is useful, the accuracy of Costabel’s conclu-
sions suffers from the vehemence of his anti-positivism.
47 For the table see ’S GRAVESANDE 1742, vol. I, 246-247. Three more scholia follow directly
after this one, but these are mostly concerned with finding the time in which the cavity
is made after impact. ’s Gravesande found different curves to express this time for dif-
ferent figures; see in particular ibid., 252-254.
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hemisphere of the ball dropped down; this volume of the hemisphere is set to
the value 1,000 in the table. To find the number in the third column, one first
needs to calculate the height of the cavity with the formula:
h=R−√R2−r2  
with R the radius of the ball itself and r the radius of the cavity, i.e. half its
diameter. This relation follows easily from elementary geometry but in order
to compute the values of h, one still has to approximate the value of the
square root. Furthermore, in order to find the volume of the cavity and state
this in proportion to the volume of the ball itself one needs to make use of the








With Vcav the volume of the cavity and Vhemisphere the volume of half the ball. To
find the values of the third column, one then has to find the proportions
between these volumes. Inserting the above formula for h and multiplying by
1,000 gives the following recipe to find S, the proportional volumes of the
cavities that ’s Gravesande actually compared and that are stated in the third





Although none of these operations demands advanced mathematics, it seems
reasonable to suppose that one needs to be at least comfortable with basic
geometry. Similarly, finding dozens of numerical values of S, as ’s Graves-
ande did in his scholium, would have costed a significant amount of time for
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one who did not deal frequently with such computational issues.48
In this particular case, ’s Gravesande used mathematics first of all in
setting up his experiments in such a way that one could get useful but simple
quantitative relations between the different entities encountered in the
experiments. From these experiments and their simple results, he would then
try to find more general relations by applying somewhat more difficult geo-
metry and algebra. In the other examples discussed in this section, we have
seen that he also applied more complex mathematics in order to discuss such
things as the oscillations of pendulums. This same description of pendulums
was furthermore used in a later chapter to describe the propagation of
sounds. Thus, it seems that we should understand ’s Gravesande’s claim to
perform mathematical physics most of all in the sense that he first worked
with carefully set up quantitative measurements, and second that he used
mathematical relations to derive more abstract generalizations from these
controlled experiments. Evidently, mathematics played a significant
methodological role in ’s Gravesande’s experimental physics.
4. Mathematical reasoning and mathematical evidence
   Having said this about the use of mathematics in his physics, the question
of what ’s Gravesande exactly meant with the other application of mathemat-
ics needs to be addressed as well. What about mathematics made it so useful
to philosophy and the art of reasoning in general? To answer this question,
we should begin to ask what it meant to think at all, according to ’s
48 In my case, I wish to thank Nigel Vinckier for his help in dealing with the mathematics
involved. Getting the numerical values is of course unproblematic with modern techno-
logy; those of ’s Gravesande’s table generally seem to be correct. This indicates that his
approximation of the square roots was performed with sufficient precision.
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Gravesande: what was his description of the process of reasoning itself? ’s
Gravesande spent ample time to explain exactly this in several of his works,
and in particular in his last book, the Introductio ad philosophiam, which was
used to teach logic and metaphysics. There, too, he claimed that mathematics
was central to reasoning, as he argued that «by well ordered exercise in the
mathematical sciences, the higher faculties of memorizing are made more
perfect».49
The gist of his ideas on this topic was however already contained in the
oration on mathematics ’s Gravesande gave in 1717, and it is illuminating to
follow the argument presented there in some detail. According to ’s Graves-
ande, if we wanted to reason well we should first of all train our minds to do
so. Like all other skills, reasoning could be improved by practice. Further-
more, he claimed that the art of reasoning was the same in all sciences. It
would begin with comparing different ideas in our mind and judging wheth-
er these ideas would be similar or different. In all our reasonings, he asserted,
we would therefore constantly make judgements about the agreement of two
ideas.50 This would be straightforward as long as ideas could be compared
easily. The best thing about numbers, ’s Gravesande explained, was that com-
paring them posed no problems whatsoever:
Of the idea of sums of numbers, for instance four and five, if they would be
compared with the idea of the number nine, we will perceive with a single look
that these do not to differ between them.51
49 ’S GRAVESANDE 1736, 266: «In Mathematicis scientiis, exercitatione bene ordinata, perfec-
tiores fiunt superius memoratae facultates».
50 ’S GRAVESANDE 1717, 3-4.
51 Ibid., 5: «Idea numerorum summae, ex. gr. quator & quinque, si conferatur cum idea nu-
meri novem, unico intuitu videmus ideas has inter se non differre».
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Yet, in most other cases such a straightforward comparisons could not be
made. In these cases, ’s Gravesande maintained, we need to introduce
«middle ideas». He continued to argue that we need to be very precise in
making trains of thoughts and that we need to train our mind in finding the
right middle ideas to connect the ideas that we want to compare; that we
should not invoke things which are irrelevant; and that we should have evid-
ent foundations for our thoughts.52 Most interestingly, however, was that ’s
Gravesande claimed that even though it was the study of logic that would
teach us the rules of reasoning, it was «mathesis [that] renders [them] truly
familiar by continuous use, and by that study, the indispensable force of the
mind of reasoning well is strengthened».53 This, he repeated over and over,
was the case because the object of mathematics was quantity and we under-
stood the relations between quantities so well that we could not err in seeing
whether quantities agreed with each other or not. Consequently, practicing
our skill in reasoning would best be done in mathematics.54 In a second ora-
tion held in 1724, ’s Gravesande made his point about the strength of math-
ematical reasoning even stronger:
I would say that anybody, [even if this person] is not well versed in the math-
ematical disciplines, but is only a beginner, and somebody at the first steps,
would perceive that these sciences lay claim to the particular method to prove
52 Ibid., 5-6. According to SCHUURMAN 2004, 131-132, ’s Gravesande’s discussion of ideas
and faculties of understanding, as set out most elaborately in the Introductio ad philoso-
phiam, largely follows the tradition of the ‘logic of ideas’ developed by Descartes,
Arnauld, Malebranche, and Locke; yet Schuurman insists that ’s Gravesande’s discus-
sion of moral and mathematical evidence, to which I will turn now, contains many new
insights.
53 Ibid., 6: «Logica regulas in ratiocinando observandas exponit, Mathesis vero continuo
usu familiares reddit, & in illius studio, mentis vis ad bene ratiocinandum necessaria
corroboratur».
54 Ibid., 7: «ut mens attenta nunquam erret in pronuntiando de illarum [quantitatum] con-
venientia aut dissensione».
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the truth; and that mathematical demonstrations are accompanied by evidence,
which overcomes stubbornness that is invincible by all other means.55
Here again, we see that ’s Gravesande stressed the methodological import-
ance of mathematics. In this second oration, which had the title De evidentia, ’s
Gravesande’s elaborated on the issue by distinguishing two types of evid-
ence, mathematical evidence and moral evidence. Although this distinction
has attracted quite some attention in recent years, the focus has generally
been on moral evidence rather than on mathematical evidence because of the
former’s critical role in ’s Gravesande’s legitimation of empirical know-
ledge.56 I will come back to moral evidence shortly, but our focus here should
be on the role of mathematical evidence in reasoning. In 1724, ’s Gravesande
argued again that if we have two ideas in our mind, we will necessarily see
whether they are similar or not:
Therefore, these things are opposed: for the mind to perceive ideas, and it not to
perceive a true comparison that is given between the ideas; from this [the mind]
will be self-conscious of this perception, and it will have the persuasion that no
doubt about this comparison is able to survive.57
The first example he provided for such a comparison was again one taken
from elementary arithmetic, now between the number seven and the sum of
55 ’S GRAVESANDE 1734, vol. II, 3. «Nemo non dicam in Mathematicis disciplinis versatus,
sed in hisce scientiis tiro, & quidem in primo limine, non percepit, peculiarem proban-
dae veritatis Methodum sibi vindicare sciencias hasce; Mathematicasque demonstratio-
nes Evidentiâ concomiitari, pertinaciam omni alio modo invictam superante».
56 As becomes clear from the titles of GORI 1991 and DE PATER 1995. More recent treat-
ments follow this pattern, see SCHUURMAN 2004, 141-146 and DUCHEYNE 2014(1), 41-43.
57 ’S GRAVESANDE 1734 II, 6: «Pugnantia ergo haec sunt, Mentem percipere ideas, & hanc
non percipere veram quae datur inter ideas comparationem; & eo ipso hujus perceptio-
nis sibi conscia erit, persuasumque habebit dubium nullum circa hanc comparationem
superesse posse».
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the numbers three and four. He concluded that the immediate perception we
have of such comparisons is the «foundation of mathematical evidence» and
that this evidence itself was its own criterion of truth.58 Right after this, ’s
Gravesande repeated that mathematics had «the privilege not to err» and re-
capitulated in three points «the object of mathesis and the method of mathem-
atics».59 In reverse order, these three points were that mathematicians pro-
ceeded from the simple to the more compound by the use of middle ideas;
that mathematics treated of quantities, the easiest ideas to compare;60 and,
first in ’s Gravesande’s list, that:
Mathesis treats of ideas, and of ideas only; and the mathematician, qua math-
ematician, attends not in the least to whether the ideas about which is reasoned
correspond or not to any thing that exists.61
His point here was that mathematics would not treat of what we would call
concrete things, but concerned only the abstract. ’s Gravesande clearly made
a distinction between what was in our mind, namely ideas, and that which
was not, the concrete. If we wanted to reason about something concrete, as
we would do for instance in physics, we first had to form an idea of it, and
ideas were of course located in our mind. This formation of ideas of concrete
things, the passage from the concrete to our mind, however, was according to
58 Ibid., 7: «veri desideratum criterium ipsam esse Evidentiam», ’s Gravesande explicitly
proposes this as the answer to a sceptical demand for a criterion of truth. See GORI 1991,
21 for discussion.
59 Ibid., 8: «haud difficulter probabimus quare Mathesis sibi non satis aestimandum vindi-
cet privilegium non errare: cujus ut pateat justus titulus, quaedam de Matheseos objecto,
Mathematicorumque methodo breviter memoranda erunt».
60 Ibid., 8-9.
61 Ibid., 8: «Versatur Mathesis circa ideas, & circa ideas tantum; minimeque curat Mathe-
maticus, qua Mathematicus, utrum ideae de quibus ratiocinantur cum ulla re quae est
congruant an non».
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’s Gravesande excluded from the discipline of mathematics. This was the case
for a couple of other sciences as well, ’s Gravesande claimed. Among these
were logic, ontology, and the foundations of ethics. These sciences did not ad-
dress anything but ideas in the mind, excluding the world around us from
their scope. Because of that, we could simply deduce propositions from self-
evident first principles, that is, we could exclusively make use of mathematic-
al evidence.62 Other sciences, though, such as physics, history, and theology
had no first principles that were self-evident and therefore could not rely
purely on logical deduction: this is where we find one of the limits of the ap-
plication of mathematics. Instead of on deduction, ’s Gravesande maintained,
these sciences had to be founded on our observations of the world around us.
Therefore, they had to make use of what ’s Gravesande referred to as moral
evidence rather than mathematical evidence.63 This way, ’s Gravesande expli-
citly distinguished between sciences that are, and the sciences that are not
based on this so-called mathematical evidence.
If, according to ’s Gravesande, mathematical evidence was gained
through comparison of ideas and strict deduction from such comparisons,
this entailed that this type of evidence could only be gained from demonstrat-
ively true propositions, that is, principles of which the negation would be
evidently false.64 If the elementary rules of arithmetic are taken for granted,
this is certainly the case for ’s Gravesande’s cherished example of 4 + 5 = 9. Its
opposite, that is, the negation of this statement, would be 4 + 5 ≠ 9.
62 Ibid., 11-14.
63 Ibid., 17-19.
64 GORI 1991, 21, rightly asserts that, for ’s Gravesande, «mathematics have their criterion
of truth in the principle of contradiction», whereas this is not the case for «matters of
fact», ibid. According to ’s Gravesande, a proposition and its opposite could both be
possibly true if we talked about concrete things. Mathematical evidence on the contrary
applied where the opposite of a true proposition was necessarily false.
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Obviously, the first statement is correct and the second incorrect. Thus, we
have mathematical evidence for a proposition if and only if we can
demonstrate by deduction that it is correct in this sense.
For this to be possible, one of course needed to start the deduction from
self-evidently true principles. One might grant that this is the case in arith-
metic, but for a field like ontology, where according to ’s Gravesande math-
ematical evidence applied as well, this was much less obvious. One particular
short example ’s Gravesande provided in the oration of 1724 might help to
clarify his thoughts. This particular demonstration made use of two axioms.
The first of these was that «there is something now, therefore there has been
something from eternity»;65 if this would not be true, ‘something’ had been
created at a particular moment out of ‘nothing’, which ’s Gravesande clearly
considered impossible.66 His second axiom was «cogito ego»; ’s Gravesande
clearly regarded both of these as self-evidently true. From the fact that he was
thinking ’s Gravesande deduced that he was intelligent. Combining this with
the first axiom, he concluded that the first cause also needed to be intelligent
for otherwise intelligence would have come out of nothing, which would be
impossible. Moreover, this intelligence must infinitely exceed all other intelli-
gences in order to create them: this first intelligent cause of course would be
God.67
Hence, ’s Gravesande claimed to have mathematical evidence for the
existence of God as the first cause. From the fact that God must be infinitely
65 ’S GRAVESANDE 1734, vol. II, 12. «Aliquid nunc est; ergo aliquid ab aeterno fuit».
66 This is a version of the cosmological argument which posits God as the first cause of all
things. In a manuscript published only posthumously, ’S GRAVESANDE 1774, in particular
176-179, ’s Gravesande developed this argument more completely. I will discuss this
elsewhere in more detail.
67 ’S GRAVESANDE 1734, vol. II, 12.
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intelligent, ’s Gravesande furthermore set out to prove that we could have
certain and reliable knowledge in the fields that depend on moral evidence.
From God’s intelligence, his goodness immediately followed according to ’s
Gravesande.68 Moreover, since man is in need of knowledge of the world
around him, God would contradict his own goodness if he would not have
given man the means to acquire such knowledge.69 Because of this, know-
ledge of things outside of our minds could be gained if we would carefully
handle the three «aids» we had for finding it, these aids being our senses, the
testimony of others, and analogical reasoning.70 Therefore, ’s Gravesande
claimed to have demonstrated with mathematical evidence, the method ex-
emplified by mathematics itself, that those sciences relying on mere moral
evidence could give us true knowledge as well:
[We] see how much the foundations of assent will differ for different circum-
stances. But even as these different foundations are allowed, and it is allowed
that mathematical evidence would not in the least coincide with moral evid-
ence, a different persuasion [for them] nevertheless does not follow from that.71
Thus, the type of deductive reasoning learned from mathematics was used by
’s Gravesande to prove that the sciences that depended on moral evidence,
such as physics, could deliver true knowledge if we used our resources well.
Physics in particular, however, had another relation with mathematics as
68 Ibid., 13.
69 Ibid., 21-22.
70 Ibid., 20: «Auxilia haec sunt Sensus, Testimonium, & Analogia». This argument is
treated at length in for instance GORI 1991; GORI 1972, 228-265; DE PATER 1995, and
STRAZZONI 2015, chapter VI
71 Ibid., 24: «Videtis AA. NN. quantum different pro diversis circumstantiis assensionis
fundamenta. Sed licet different fundamenta haec, licet Evidentia Mathematica minime
cum Morali congruat, non tamen diversa inde sequitur persuasio».
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well, as «physics pertains to mixed mathematics»,72 according to ’s Graves-
ande. As we have seen, he argued that pure mathematics treated only of
ideas. Yet, he also allowed for a «mixed mathematics» that reasoned «about
the things themselves», that is, things outside our mind.73 This type of math-
ematics clearly was not based on abstract, self-evident first principles, and
therefore lacked the first of ’s Gravesande’s three reasons why mathematics
would not err. Yet, physics, or mixed mathematics, did of course treat of
quantities, the simplest ideas. It also proceeded from these simple ideas to
more complex ones, and therefore followed the method of mathematics to a
certain extent:
When, in physics, we have properly cognized the phenomena from the aids of
moral evidence, that is, when it is correct for us to hold ideas of these phenom-
ena, [ideas] which agree with the things themselves, the reasonings about these
ideas will be mathematically certain, and the conclusions can be applied to the
things themselves.74
’s Gravesande furthermore explained that, in sciences such as metaphysics,
we could depend solely on mathematical evidence because of the fact that
they concerned ideas only. Yet, since these sciences did not follow mathemat-
ics in treating quantities, they could not define the terms they used as
rigorously as mathematics could. Consequently, the axioms of metaphysics
were less obvious to interpret and therefore conclusions could not be drawn
72 ’S GRAVESANDE 1720, second page of the unnumbered Praefatio: «Ad Mathesim mixtam
pertinet Physica». See DUCHEYNE 2014(2), 101 for ’s Gravesande on mixed mathematics.
73 ’S GRAVESANDE 1734, vol. II, 8-9: «Matheseos partibus in quibus de rebus ipsis agitur […]
Mixtam in hoc casu dicimus Mathesim».
74 Ibid., 19: «Ubi in Physicis moralis Evidentiae auxilio bene cognita habemus Phaenome-
na, id est, ubi constat nos horum Phaenomenon habere ideas, quae cum rebus ipsis con-
veniunt, ratiocinia circa has ideas Mathematice certa erunt, conclusionesque ad res ipsas
poterunt applicari».
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as easily as in mathematics.75 In theology, this inexactness was present as
well. Even worse, there was according to ’s Gravesande no way to give math-
ematical evidence that God «would have declared his divine announcement
to mankind». Yet, when we had established via moral evidence that there
was in fact such a divine announcement, ’s Gravesande asserted that the «the
stability of the reasonings [that we base upon this divine announcement] will
be mathematical» again.76
What we see is that ’s Gravesande discussed methodologies of different
disciplines, and did so by comparing all of them to mathematics. Mathemat-
ics was the science where we could apply our inexorable logic most effect-
ively, «but the method that mathematicians use, [could] be applied to all sci-
ences», he claimed.77 In theology, it was only the deductive logic that we
could copy from mathematics, and only once we had established some stable
starting points via moral evidence. In physics, observation and analogy were
to provide these starting points for deductive reasoning as well, but we also
had the benefit of dealing with quantities, the ideas with which we could
avoid error easily. In metaphysics, on the other hand, we could not reason
with quantities, but instead had the gain of being able to establish our first
principles via mathematical evidence, that is, simply by demonstration from
self-evident ideas. 
75 Ibid., 14-16.
76 Ibid., 17-18: «an suprema & infinita Intelligentia voluntatem suam Hominibus peculiari-
bus declaraverit Oraculis […] hoc ex simplici idearum collatione nunquam determinari
poterit: ubi autem de Oraculis constat, conclusiones, ex iis deducendae […] ad ideas
spectabunt; & ratiociniorum stabilitas Mathematica erit». ’s Gravesande of course im-
plied that such an announcement could be found in Scripture.




   As has become clear in this article, ’s Gravesande regarded the methodo-
logy of mathematics as a prototype of stable and certain reasoning. Mathem-
atics and mathematical reasoning provided the way to achieve true know-
ledge in philosophy in general and in physics in particular. The ‘art of reason-
ing’ was best learnt through mathematics because it was in that science that
we found its clearest application. Mathematics had three characteristics that
led us to avoid errors: building trains of thoughts via rigorous deduction;
handling only abstract ideas for which we did not need knowledge of the
things themselves; and pertaining to quantities, the simplest ideas. All other
sciences lacked at least one of these characteristics, but according to ’s
Gravesande would best follow the mathematical method with regards to the
others as much as possible.
In its application to physics, mathematics played a methodological role,
too, and it is here that we find the sort of unitary answer that Gori has asked
for. First, ’s Gravesande carried out quantitative measurements with great re-
gard for detail. Because mathematics was according to ’s Gravesande the
study that related to quantities, these measurements were inevitably math-
ematical. Yet, ’s Gravesande also applied higher level mathematics to his
physics in order to compare different concepts, or ideas in his own vocabu-
lary, to each other quantitatively. Contrary to what has been claimed in re-
cent literature, he had solid reasons for calling his physics ‘mathematical’ as
mathematics helped him to derive more abstract generalizations from his
measurements. Clearly, we would, according to ’s Gravesande’s philosophy,
have moral evidence for such generalizations. If we had been careful enough,
these generalizations were to be considered as certain, and could be used as
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axioms or principles on which we could build further reasoning. For ’s
Gravesande, the role of mathematics was clearly to provide a rigorous and
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TABLE 1: ’S GRAVESANDE 1742, I, 247. ’s Gravesande referred his readers to this
table in his famous vis viva experiment. The first column gives the diameter of
the cavity, the second its computed height, and the third its volume in pro-
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